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LAST YEAR marked a transition for the economy,
for the direction of monetary policies, and for the im-
plementation of these policies. At the beginning of
1970, the nation was suffering from the continuation
of inflation caused by the excesses of 1965 through
1968, as well as wealmess in production resulting from
the corrective steps taken in 1969. Monetary pohcy-
makers were faced with the question of whether a
growth rate of total spending could be achieved
which would be conducive both to reduction of infla-
tion and to renewed growth in production.
In the first two meetings of 1970 the Federal Open
Market Committee,’ the primary monetary policy-
making group, decided to change the direction of its
policy by moving cautiously toward a less restrictive
pollcy. As the year 1970 progressed, real GNP de-
clined slightly, unemployment rose considerably, and
price increases tended to slow,2 Because of this slug-
gish performnance of the economy, the Committee
pursued a more expansionary policy through the year.
The method of implementing the Committee’s pol-
icy decisions also was modified in 1970, compared to
the approach taken in the previous two decades, At
the January meeting, the Committee stated its desire
to have increased emphasis placed on achieving spe-
cific growth rates of certain mnonetary aggregates. The
amount of emphasis given to achieving growth targets
of the aggregates, however, varied considerably dur-
ing the year.
This article examines and summarizes the monetary
policy decisions of the Committee in 1970. The main
source of information is the “Record of Policy
Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee,”
‘The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) henceforth
will be referred to as the”Committee” in this article.
tm
See Nonnan N. Bowsher, “1970— Economy in Transition,”
this Review (December 1970), pp. 2-13 for a review of eco-
nomic developments in 1970.
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which is released to the public about 90 days after
each meeting.’ The records include the directive to
the New York Federal Reserve Bank, a summary of
information reviewed by the Committee members,
discussion of prevailing and prospective economic
conditions, and a summamy of the discussion on policy
matters by the members.
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION IN 1970
The Committee’s basic concern in the long run is
the perfonnance of the economy in terms of produc-
tion, employment, prices, and the balance of pay-
ments. The variable over which the Committee has
direct control, the buying and selling of Government
securities, does not affect these ultimate objectives
directly. Open market operations, however, affect var-
ious monetary and financial variables, including the
money stock, bank credit, and market interest rates.
These variables, in turn, affect the spending decisions
of consumers and businesses, and ultimately influence
production, employment, prices, and the balance of
payments.
Interest Rates and Monetary Aggregates
In general, there are at least two broad views con-
cerning the manner in which Federal Reserve policy
actions are transmitted to the economy. Each view has
associated with it an indicator which measures the
thrust of mnonetary actions on the ultimate policy
goals.4 The first view emphasizes interest rates, and
the second emphasizes the money supply.
The interest rate approach uses market interest
rates as the indicator of the effect of policy actions on




See Albert E. Burger, “The Implementation Problem of
Monetary Policy,” this Review (March 1971), pp. 20-30, for
a detailed discussion of the indicator problem.
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ultimate objectives. In general, followers of this ap-
proach believe that Federal Reserve actions dominate
movements in interest rates, and that policy actions
are transmitted through interest rates to investment
and consumption expenditures, and thus the ultimate
policy objectives,
The Federal Reserve does not control interest rates
rigidly. Day-to-day open market operations are deter’
mined by looking at money market conditions, which
include such measures as free reserves, member bank
borrowings, the Federal funds rate, Treasury bill rates,
and the attitudes of major market participants. Using
these measures as “gauges,” the Federal Reserve can
affect the amount of “pressure” or “ease” in the mar-
ket, thereby influencing interest rates in the desired
direction.
An alternative approach to economic stabilization
uses the money supply as the main indicator of the
thrust of policy actions on economic activity. Accord-
ing to this view, changes in the nation’s money stock
have a substantial influence on the growth of total
spending in the economy over a year or more. It is
contended that policy actions should be directed
towards maintaining relatively stable growth of the
money stock in order to achieve a long-run growth of
total spending which is consistent with full employ-
ment and stable prices.
Supporters of this view believe that changes in the
public’s demand for credit dominate movements in
market interest rates, and that the present demand
for credit is outside the direct control of the Federal
Reserve. It is held that current actions of the Federal
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in light of the foregoing developments, it
is the policy of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee to foster financial conditions conducive
to the orderly reduction of inflationary pres-
sures) with a view to encouraging sustainable
economic growth and attaining reasonable




To implement this policy) while taking account of
the forthcoming Treasury refunding, possible bank reg-
ulatory changes and the Committee’s desire to see a
modest growth in money and bank credit, System open
market operations until the next meeting of the Committee
shall be conducted with a view to maintaining firm con-
ditions in the money market,
Proviso Clause of Directive
provided, however, that operations shall be modified
if money and bank credit appear to be deviating




February 10 No Change -. -while taking account of the current Treasury refunding, provided) however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents: possible bank regulatory changes and the Committee’s promptly to resist any tendency for money and bank
Mr. Hayes desire to see moderate growth in money and bank credit credit to deviate significantly from a moderate growth
Mr. Brimmer over the months ahead, System open market operations pattern.
Mr. Coldwell until the next meeting of the Committee shall be con-
ducted with a view to moving gradually toward somewhat
less firm conditions in the money market;
March 10 In light of the foregoing developments, it .. .the Committee desires to see moderate growth in no proviso clause
is the policy of the Federal Open Market Com- money and bank credit over the months ahead. System
mittee to foster financial conditions conducive to open market operations until the next meeting of the
orderly reduction in the rate of inflation, while Committee shall be conducted with a view to maintaining
encouraging the resumption of sustainable eca- money market conditions consistent with that objective.
nomic growth and the attainment of reasonable




April 7 No Change .- -the Committee desires to see moderate growth in no proviso clause
Dissents, money and bank credit over the months ahead. System
None open market operations until the next meeting of the
Committee shall be conducted with a view to maintaining
money market conditions consistent with that objective,
taking account of the forthcoming_Treasury financing
May 5 No Change .- -the Committee desires to see moderate growth in provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents, money and bank credit over the months ahead. System as needed to moderate excessive pressures in financial
Mr. Francis open market operations until the next meeting of the
Committee shall be conducted with a view to maintaining
bank reserves and money market conditions consistent
with that objective, taking account of the current Treasury
financing,
markets, should they develop.
May 26 Na Change ...in view of current market uncertainties and liquidity no proviso clause
Dissents, strains, open market operations until the next meeting of
None the Committee shall be conducted with 0 view to moderat-
ing pressures on financial markets, while, to the extent
compatible therewith, maintaining bank reserves and
money market conditions consistent with the Committee’s
longer-run objectives of moderate growth in money and
bank credit.June 23 No Change ..-in view of persisting market uncertainties and liquidity no proviso clause
Dissents, strains, open market operations until the next meeting of
None the Committee shall continue to be conducted with a view
to moderating pressures on financial markets. To the ex-
tent compatible therewith, the bank reserves and money
market conditions maintained shall be consistent with
the Committee’s longer-run objective of moderate growth
in money and bank credit, taking account of the Board’s
regulatory action effective June 24 and some possible
consequent shifting at credit flows from market to banking
channels.
July 21 No Change ... while taking account of persisting market uncertainties, provided, however, that operations shall be modified
Dissents, liquidity strains, and the forthcoming Treasury financing, as needed to counter excessive pressures in financial
None the Committee seeks to promote moderate growth in
money and bank credit over the months ahead, allowing
for a possible continued shift of credit flaws from market
to banking channels. System open market operations until
the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted
with a view to maintaining bank reserves and money
market conditions consistent with that objective;
markets should they develop.
August 18 No Change .. -the Committee seeks to promote some easing of no proviso clause
Dissents, conditions in credit markets and somewhat greater growth
Mr. Hayes in money over the months ahead than occurred in the
Mr. Brimmer second quarter, while taking account of possible liquidity
Mr. Francis problems and allowing bank credit growth to reflect any
continued shift of credit flows from market to banking
channels. System open market operations until the next
meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view
to maintaining bank reserves and money market conditions
consistent with that objective, taking account of the effects
of other monetary policy actions.
September 15 Na Change ..-the Committee seeks to promote some easing of can- no proviso douse
Dissents, ditions in credit markets and moderate growth in money
Mr. Hayes and attendant bank credit expansion over the months
ahead. System open market operations until the next
meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view
to maintaining bank reserves and money market con-
ditions consistent with that objective.
October 20 Na Change -. -the Committee seeks to promote some easing of no proviso clause
Dissents, conditions in credit markets and moderate growth in
Mr. Hayes money and attendant bonk credit expansion over the
months ahead. System open market operations until the
next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a
view to maintaining bank reserves and money market
conditions consistent with those objectives, taking account
of the forthcoming Treasury financings.
November 17 No Change .. .the Committee seeks to promote some easing of no proviso clause
Dissents, conditions in credit markets and moderate growth in
Mr. Maisel money and attendant bank credit expansion aver the
months ahead, with allowance for temporary shifts in
money and credit demands related to the auto strike.
System open market operations until the next meeting of
the Committee shalt be conducted with a view to main-
taining bank reserves and money market conditions con-
sistent with those objectives.
December 18 No Change .. -System open market operations shall be conducted provided that the expected rates of, growth in money
Dissents, with a view to maintaining the recently attained money and bank credit will at least be achieved.
Mr. Francis market conditions until the next meeting of the Committee,
— SOURCE, “Record of Policy Actions of the Pederal
Open Mar/ret Co,ssmiffee,” Ourrent
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Reserve influence the public’s future demand for
credit through its delayed influence on total spend-
ing. Such lagged effects of previous policy actions
result in current interest rates giving misleadinginfor-
mation about the effects of monetary actions on total
spending.
For instance, when an economic recovery is occur-
ring, rising interest rates reflect a growing demand for
credit, as business firms seek to expand productive
capacity and build inventories. If policymakers view
the rising interest rates as being restrictive, they may
attempt to direct open market operations to resist the
tightening of credit conditions, in order to stabilize or
slow the rise in interest rates, To accomplish this, re-
serves would have to be supplied at rapid rates, re-
sulting in an accelerating growth rate of the money
stock. After some lime lag, the rapid growth in money
would induce further acceleration in growth of total
spending, resulting in inflation and even higher inter-
est rates as an inflation premium becomes built into
market interest rates.
Before 1970, the Committee followed more closely
the money market conditions approach of implement-
ing its policy decisions, In 1970, more emphasis was
placed on monetary aggregates. However, according
to an article in the February 1971 Federal Reserve
Bulletin, the increased emphasis on aggregates since
early 1970 “is consistent with a variety of economic
theories, and does not necessarily imply any particular
judgment as to the importance for the economy of
monetary flows relative to interest rates and credit
conditions or relative to other influences such as fiscal
policy and technological innovation.”5
In 1970, a hybrid approach was employed of con-
trolling money market conditions on a day-to-day
basis with a view to controlling monetary aggregates
over the longer term, According to this approach, the
growth of the demand deposit component of the
money stock can be influenced by appmpriate adjust-
ment of money market pressures. The central idea is
that the demand for money is influenced by interest
rates as well as so-called transactions needs of the
public, and that money market pressures can be con-
trolled in such a way to achieve a desired growth of
deposits.
At the January 1970 meeting, the Committee cx-
plicifly stated its desire to have more importance
placed on achieving growth rates of monetary aggre-
gates when conducting open market operations. A
5
”Monetary Aggregates and Money Market Conditions in Open
Market Policy,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (February 1971),
p. 86.
principal change in the implementation of policy,
which accompanied the greater attention on mone-
tary aggregates, was that the Committee adopted a
somewhat longer horizon in specifying the desired
changes in policy variables. Specifically, quarterly
goals for money6 were set at the meeting preceding
each quarter and reviewed as the quarter progressed.
This longer time horizon allowed greater flexibility in
attaining the money and bank credit targets, while
avoiding excessive short-run fluctuations in interest
rates.
Modifying Objectives
Although the Committee put more emphasis on
achieving desired growth rates of monetary aggre-
gates, other short-run objectives were specified in
most directives, as was done in the past. In addition
to policy goals regarding production, prices, employ-
ment and the balance of payments, the Federal Re-
serve has generally assumed responsibility for main-
taining orderly and smoothly functioning money
markets. This responsibility is assumed, partly be-
cause orderly market conditions are considered desir-
able by some in order to successfully achieve the
objectives of the Committee. According to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin, “the nation’s central bank has
a unique responsibility for maintenance of orderly
conditions”7 in the money market. One interpretation
of this objective is that disorderly markets might
develop in absence of the Federal Reserve’s efforts.
In accord with this self-imposed objective, empha-
sis on aggregates received secondary importance when
conflicts arose. For instance, at the late May meeting
and the June meeting, the Committee wa~largely
concerned with excessive pressures in credit markets,
and directed that open market operations be con-
ducted so as to moderate such conditions. Many
followers of the money supply approach, however,
believe that the Federal Reserve System can make its
greatest contribution toward avoiding disorderly mar-
ket conditions by keeping the growth of money in a
moderate range.
Most directives in 1970 also called for other items
to be taken into account as open market operations
were carried out. Five directives called for specific
consideration of either regulatory changes (Regula-
tions D and Q) or the shifts in funds from market to
banking channels caused by changing relationships be-
tween Regulation Q ceilings and market interest rates.
°Targetsfor bank credit were also given at some meetings,
but, in general, money was the dominant aggregate target. 7”Monetary Aggregates and Money Market Conditions in
Open Market Policy,” p. 94.
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During 1970, six directives called for the Account
Manager to consider “forthcoming” or “current” Treas-
ury financings. Historically, the Federal Reserve has
assumed some responsibility in keeping market con-
ditions conducive to the success
often referred to as “even-keel”
tive of “even-keel” operations
market conditions during the
Treasury’s announcement of a
their sale, and thus to maintain
tive market for these securities.
Reserve may buy securities in
Treasury is selling. Particular
of Treasury financings,
operations. The objec-
is to stabilize money
period between the
security offering and
an orderly and recep-
In effect, the Federal
the market while the
emphasis was placed
on even-keel operations in late April and in May of
1970, “when it appeared that the Treasury’s cash
financing might be in jeopardy.”
Achieving Targets for Monetary Aggregates
In carrying out day-to-day open market operations
in 1970, the Desk relied mainly on money market con-
ditions.8 On a daily basis, the Desk concentrated
principally on the Federal funds rate, which was
thought to be consistent with the desired target
growth rates for the monetary aggregates. By main-
taining the Federal funds rate in a prespecified
range, an attempt was made to obtain the desired
growth of aggregates. This approach implies that the
quantity of securities purchased by the Desk is not as
important in influencing the near-term growth of
money as the effect of these actions on money market
conditions,
Uncertainties surrounding a revision of the money
stock series caused difficulties for policymakers in
1970. In the latter half of 1970, it became known that
a measurement error arising from certain international
transactions was contained in the money series.9 The
revised series was available to the Committee in com-
pleted form at the November meeting, but at the
preceding two or three meetings, the Committee had
only a rough idea of the magnitude of the underesti-
mation of money growth indicated by the old money
series,10
5lbid., p. 94, for a rationale for continuing the use of money
market conditions. Also see Paul Meek and Rudolf Thunberg,
“Monetary Aggregates and Federal Reserve Open Market
Operations,” Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (April 1971), pp. 80-89.
°For a detailed explanation of the revision, see Albert F.
Burger and Jerry L. Jordan, “The Revised Money Stock:
Explanation and Illustrations,” this Review (January 1971),
pp. 6-15.
10
Because of the revision, three money series are used in this
paper: old, revised, and roughly adjusted. Unless otherwise
specified, references to money will be the old series.
Initially, it appeared that in the first three quarters
of 1970, money growth had been in the range desired
by the Committee, but the revised series indicated
that money had grown more rapidly than desired. For
instance, the old money series gresv at a 4.4 per cent
annual rate during the first three quarters of 1970,
compared with a 6.1 per cent rate for the revised
series. At the September meeting, some members ex-
pressed the view that “it would be desirable to place
less emphasis on a specific growth rate for the money
stock.”
The experience in 1970 suggests that some improve-
ment in technique may he needed in controlling ag-
gregates. The following bar chart shows actual growth
rates of money as measured by the old and revised
series, compared to that desired by the Committee in
the four quarters of 1970. Better control over mone-
tary aggregates might have been achieved by a more
direct method, such as by concentration on bank re-
serves or the monetary base, rather than the state of
money market conditions.
FEDERAL OPEN MARKET
COMMITTEE DECISIONS IN 1970
This section presents a summary of the 1970 policy
decisions of the Committee. The discussion outlines
the economic data and forecasts available to the Com-
mittee at the time of each meeting and the policy de-
cisions at each meeting. The policy directives of the
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to move toward more emphasis on monetary aggre-
gates in implementing monetary policy and to pursue
a more expansionary monetary policy than was sought
during 1969. May through July was characterized by
pressures in financial markets and subsequent subor-
dination of monetary aggregates in an effort to main-
tam money market conditions conducive to some eas-
ing of strained market conditions. From August
through November, the Committee reinstated target
growth ranges of monetary aggregates and, in addi-
tion, specifically called for some easing in money and





Emphasis on Monetary Aggregates
The Committee gradually moved toward a more ex-
pansionary policy in this period. Many members ~vere
concerned about a possible renewal of inflationary
expectations if easing came too fast or was too pro-
nounced. In addition to changing the direction of
monetary policy action, the Committee also stated its
desire to have more emphasis placed on monetary
aggregates in the formulation and implementation of
policy.
Committee for 1970 can be divided into four periods. towards less emphasis on monetary aggregates
January through April entailed the important decisions more emphasis on money market conditions.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1971
Economic Outlook and Policy Decisions
of the Committee
January 15 Affecting — Available data showed that
real CNP had not grown in the fourth quarter of 1969,
industrial production had fallen for five consecutive
months, and prices were still rising rapidly. Board of
Covernors staff projections noted that prospects were
for “httle change in real economic activity in early
1970.” The staff also projected that prices would con-
tinue to rise rapidly, with perhaps some moderation
as the year progressed. Some expansionary elemnents
were noted, including plans by businesses to increase
expenditures on new plant and equipment in 1970,
reduction of the income tax surcharge from 10 to 5
per cent on January 1 and its elimination on July 1,
and the 15 per cent increase in social security benefits
as of January 1.
Although the Committee was aware of the reduced
level of economic activity, it was “agreed that any
marked relaxation of monetary restraint would be pre-
mature at present in light of the persistence of infla-
tionary pressures and expectations.” The main con-
cerns of Committee members continued to be
inflation, and the need to show the public a willing-
ness to persist in its restrictive policies until there was
evidence that real progress against inflation was being
attained.
Staff projections suggested that there would be little
change in money and some decline in bank credit if
prevailing money market conditions and Regulation
Q ceilings were maintained. Members expressed con-





over the course of action that should be taken. Some
members wanted money market conditions to remain
“sufficiently firm to be consistent with a posture of
monetary restraint,” but “likely to be conducive to
modest growth in bank credit and the money stock
over the first quarter.” Other members wanted the
main emphasis put on a relaxation of Regulation Q,
and some favored “maintaining the prevailing condi-
tions in the money market.”
The final decision of the Committee was to place
increased emphasis on “the objective of achieving
modest growth in monetary aggregates” giving “about
equal weight” to bank credit and the money stock.
The Committee continued in a way similar to the
past, by directing that open market operations should
be conducted “with a view to maintaining firm condi-
tions in the money market.” The Comthittee also
added a proviso clause in the January directive, stat-
ing “that operations shall be modified if money, and
bank credit appear to be deviating significantly from
current projections.” In view of the Committee’s de-
sire to pay more attention to aggregates, presumably
the proviso clause was to be invoked sooner and more
vigorously than in the past.
It \vas noted that the Board of Governors planned
to consider raising Regulation Q interest rate ceilings
“Presumably, finn conditions did not mean prevailing con-
ditions, hut some slight easing, since the staff had projected
no growth in money and a decline in bank credit if prevail-
ing money market conditions were maintained. But most
members were apparently unwilling to specify an actual
easing of market conditions in the directive at this time




// 7/ /7 / /\\////,
Page 21EXHIBIT II
MAJOR FEDERAL RESERVE AC11ONS OTHER THAN OPEN MARKET OPERAT~ONS~N 1970








The Board of Governors raised maximum interest roles payable on
time and savings deposits (Regulation 0).
June 23
(Effective June 24)
The Board of Governors suspended Regulation 0 ceilings on large
certificates of deposit and other single-maturity time deposits of 30-
to 89-day maturities.
This action was token by the Board in an effort to allow banks to be
in a position to accommodate business customers unable to obtain
funds in the commercial paper market, which at the time was under
stress. The effect was to encourage growth of large CD’s.
August 17
(Effective in the reserve computa-
tion period beginning October 1)
The Board of Governors placed reserve requirements (Regulation 0)
on funds obtained by member banks through the issuance of com-
mercial paper by their affiliates. The Board also reduced reserve
requirements from 6 to 5 per cent on time depostis in excess of $5
million.
By these actions, large certificates of deposit and funds obtained
by banks through issuance of commercial paper by their affiliates
were placed on equal terms. Subsequently, bank-related commercial
paper declined rapidly.
November 10
(Effective at all Reserve Banks by
November 16)
The Board of Governors approved a reduction in the discount rate
by Reserve Banks from 6 t
0
53/4 per cent.
This action brought the discount rate into closer alignment with
market rates which had fallen substantially.
November 30
(Effective at all Reserve Banks by
December 11)
The Board of Governors approved another reduction in the discount
rote by Reserve Banks from 534 to ~½ per cent.
This action also brought the discount rate more in line with the
rapidly falling short-term interest rates.
November 30
(Effective in the 4-week reserve
computation period ending Decem-
ber 23)
The Board of Governors raised reserve requirements frem 1 0 per
cent to 20 per cent on Eurodollar borrowings that exceed the
‘reserve-free’ base.
The action was intended to help the balance of payments by dis-















This action allowed saving funds to re-enter banking channels, thus
encouraging growth of more broadly defined aggregates such as
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soon. Effective January 21, 1970, the Board raised
ceilings on time and savings deposits. The effect of
this change was to encourage growth in bank credit
and other broadly defined aggregates (see Exhibit
II). In 1969, disinterniediation of time deposits from
banks as well as other financial intermediaries had
occurred as market interest rates rose above Regula-
tion Q ceilings. Most of these funds were simply
channeled to other market instruments, such as com-
mercial paper, and to that extent did not affect total
credit in the economy. The increase in Regulation Q
ceiling rates encouraged a rechanneling of funds back
into banks. This outflow and inflow of time deposits
during 1969 and 1970, however, distorted the growth
rates of broadly defined aggregates such as money
stock plus net time deposits, making interpretation of
these series less meaningful as indicators of monetary
influences.
February 10 Meeting — Evidence of further weak-
ening in the economy was presented, although it was
expected that some real growth would occur in the
second half of the year. Weakness in the labor market
was becoming evident, as unemployment rose from
3.5 per cent in December 1969 to 3.9 per cent in
January 1970.
The Committee agreed that “it was appropriate to
move gradually toward somewhat less restraint at this
time.” The directive issued to the Desk called for both
“moderate growth in money and bank credit over the
months ahead” and “somewhat less firm conditions in
the money market.” The word “moderate” meant a
faster rate of growth for aggregates than the “modest”
growth called for at the January meeting.
Three members of the Committee, Mr. Hayes, Mr.
Brimmer, and Mr. Coidwell, dissented from the Feb-
mary directive. They believed that “any overt move
toward less firm money market conditions was pre-
mature at this time and could strengthen market ex-
pectations of substantial easing.” They stressed the
continuing inflationary pressures, business plans for
large volume capital spending, and the prospectively
large balance-of-payments deficit, Although they
agreed that some growth in money and credit was de-
sirable, they preferred a directive similar to Janu-
ary’s which called for “firni” money market conditions
along with some growth in aggregates.
March 10 and April 7 Meetings — At these meet-
ings, important changes in the wording of the direc-
tive were made, clarifying the meaning of the new
attention to aggregates. Although the earlier directives
of 1970 gave increased importance to the money
stock and bank credit, they continued to be stated in
terms of money market conditions, with an appended
proviso clause regarding the aggregates. In the March
and April meetings, an objective with respect to
money market conditions was not specified in the
directives. Rather, the wording of these directives in-
dicated a wfflingness on the part of the Committee to
Page 23FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1971
4 >et~> ~~~ 4 ~ ,~4 %~< ~
44~,~1~\7~ :~, ~~ /




































































~J]~LTrT~JFTyTrTE rnT :rl~F ~ ~
/ ,aI/ ,~rpu~ / ‘ ~ncn / //
/4/4* 4/’ \4/4/////// ‘““‘~/~‘~:“~‘ “~/44
1
Z\, ~4
/ /,,// ,‘<~ 4/ /1/’// 44/44 /4 ‘4/,, 4’ ,~, ‘~ *444/
allow money market conditions to fluctuate if neces-
sary, in order to attain desired money and bank
credit growth targets. The March directive stated:
-..the Committee desires to see moderate growth
in money and bank credit over the months ahead.
System open market operations until the next meet-
ing of the Committee shall be conducted with a view
to maintaining money market conditions consistent
with that objective.
The growth targets for the money stock at the
March meeting called for a 2 per cent annual growth
rate in the first quarter (December 1969 to March),
and a3per cent rate in the second quarter (March to
June). At the April meeting, a 3 per cent growth tar-
get for the money stock was reaffirmed as the appro-
priate rate for the second quarter.
/4 ‘~te, <t.44/ /4’7~4’, ~ 4’,”, /‘ ‘‘x: 71~7 ‘~ “ ‘7:7’’: ~
‘2 / 72t2*Ar’*:;: ~ A
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Although as a whole the Committee showed in-
creased wifiingness to let money market conditions
fluctuate in achieving aggregate targets, some mem-
bers at the April meeting expressed concern about the
possibility of ‘wide fluctuations in money market con-
ditions. It was noted that “precise achievement” of
targets for growth of monetary aggregates “could not
be expected, in part because of the desirability of
avoiding excessive fluctuations in money market con-
ditions and in part because of uncertainties regarding
future relationships among financial variables.” This
view is in keeping with the February 1971 Bulletin
article:
whatever longer-run path for the aggregates may
be included as guidance for’ open market operations,
short-run, self-correcting variations in money and
credit demands need to be accommodated in order
to avoid inducing unnecessary, and possibly desta-




Money market conditions, measured by movements in
short-term interest rates, eased onbalance fromJanuary
through April, as some growth in monetary aggregates
was sought. The monetary base, the main determinant
of the growth trend of the money stock, grew at a 6.7
per cent annual rate from December 1969 to April
2
”Monetary Aggregates and Money Market Conditions in
Open Market Policy,” p. 80.
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1970. The money stock grew slowly in the first part
of this period, but grew very rapidly in late March
and in April. On balance in the period, money grew
at a 5.7 per cent annual rate from December 1969 to
April 1970.
Analysis given at the March meeting indicated that
further easing actions would he necessary to achieve
even a 2 per cent rate of growth of money in the first
quarter and a desired 3 per cent rate in the second
quarter. Money market conditions eased further af-
ter the March meeting, and staff projections showed
that growth rates of aggregates were falling short of
the Committee’s desired rates. Later in the month,
estimates of money growth were revised upwards,
and the Committee no longer sought easing of money
market conditions’ to promote growth of money. The
money stock jumped sharply upward in the last week
of March, due to technical factors involving a four-day
Easter holiday abroad, With this bulge, money grew
at a 3,9 per cent rate in the first quarter (December
to March), almost double the expected 2 per cent
rate at the time of the March meeting and higher
than the 3 per cent rate desired by the Committee for
the second quarter.
The Committee thus showed considerable concern
for the achievement of the growth targets for mone-
tary aggregates in early 1970, especially the money
stock. This commitment was principally characteristic
of the March and April meetings, when directives
stated that money market conditions were to be con-
sistent with the growth targets for aggregates.
Whether individual members of the Committee pre-
ferred a given money target because they agreed
with the underlying money market condition associ-
ated with the target, or vice versa, is difficult to assess.
The Committee was willing, however, to accept firmer
conditions in late March and April in order to hold
down the growth of money when projections indicated
money was growing rapidly. As noted earlier, how-
ever, the Committee evidently was not willing to
pursue a given quarterly target independent of the
money market conditions that might be implied by
the actions required to achieve the aggregate target.
May through July: Emphasis on
Moderating Pressure in Money
and Credit Markets
During this period, there was considerable concern
by members of the Committee about pressures in the
money markets and a possible liquidity crisis. Follow-
ing the late May and June meetings, open market
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operations \vere aimed primarily at dealmg with the
unsettled atmosphere m the money and credit mar
kets and less emphasis was placed on achieving
targets for monetary aggregates.
Economic Outlook and Policy Decisions
May 5 Meeting — Preliminary Commerce Depart-
ment estimates mdicated a decline in real CNP for
the first quartcr Projections suggested little real
economic growth in the second quarter, but some
renewed growth in the second half of 1970 It was
noted at this meetmg that pnces continued to nse
although there were some moderatmg tendencies
The unemployment rate continued upward reaching
48 per centm Apnl
The unsettled condition of financial markets was
also noted at this meeting Most interest rates had
nsen from the April to May 5 meeting counter to the
general expectation of many market participants
Also common stock market prices fell sharply in
April and continued to fall in May
Apparently many factors contnbuted to the mterest
rate increases Factors cited at the May 5 meeting
included concern by market participants about the
prospects for success of the Governments anti infia
tionary program the Cambodian military operations
and the unusually heavy demand for funds in the
capital market Rising interest rates appeared to be
particularly unsettling due to the general expectation
that continued declines in interest rates would ac-
company the slowdown in economic activity.
In light of these various developments, and in view
of the fact that money was growing more rapidly
than previously projected and that attempts to main-
tain the 3 per cent growth target for money might
have undesired consequences, the Committee in-
creased its second quarter growth target for money to
4 per cent. The staff analysis indicated that this rate
could be achieved “with money market conditions
similar to or slightly firmer than those currently pre-
vailing.” The Committee felt that the “demand for
money” was greater than was thought earlier.it Ac-
cording to a recent Federal Reserve report, “while
anxieties in financial circles that a general liquidity
squeeze was emerging proved to be clearly exagger-
ated, it is true nonetheless that their net effect
was to cause a sharp increase in over-all demand for
liquidity.”ii
I::ln this context, demand for credit is implied, rather than
demand for money. The ambiguity is widely discussed in
economic literature.
I4Federal Reserve Board of Governors, The U.S Economy in
Transition — A Prelude to the Annual Report for 1970, p. 18.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1971
The operating clause of the early May directive
was quite similar to that of the previous month, ex-
cept a proviso clause was added which stated:
that operations shall be modified as needed to
moderate excessive pressures in financial markets,
should they develop.
Mr. Francis dissented from the decision to accept
the faster target rate of growth in money. He argued
that a4per cent annual rate in the second quarter
would imply a8per cent rate from February to June,
and he considered such a rate excessive.
May 26 Meeting — It was observed that revised
Commerce Department figures for real GNP showed
a decline at a 3 per cent annual rate in the first quar-
ter of 1970. Real GNP was still expected to rise in the
second half of 1970, although not as much as previ-
ously expected, with projections indicating no growth
in the second quarter.
Uncertainties and strains surrounding the “liquidity
crisis” continued to be primary concerns of the Com-
mittee at the late May meeting. The Committee
stated a desire to see moderate growth in money and
bank credit, but priority ~vas to be given to the objec-
tive of moderating pressures in financial markets. The
Committee acknowledged that this might bring a
higher growth rate of money than the 4 per cent con-
sidered appropriate as the long-run objective. Projec-
tions indicated a 7 per cent rate of growth of money
was likely in the second quarter, compared with an
earlier target of 3 per cent, and indicated firmer
money market conditions would develop if an effort
were made to hit the 4 per cent target of the
Committee.
June 23 Meeting — Financial markets were reported
to have “calmed considerably” immediately following
the May 26 meeting, and interest rates on many
short-term instruments ~vere tending to move down-
ward. Long-term rates, however, continued to move
upward, many reaching their 1970 peaks in June.
New uncertainties were introduced into financial mar-
kets by the insolvency of the Penn Central Railroad,
which caused the commercial paper market to be
particularly sensitive. Yields on commercial paper
tended to rise, as investors became more selective and
aware of the risks involved in such paper.
In view of the uncertainties and strains in financial
niarkets, the Committee again directed that open mar-
ket operations be carried out with the objective of
moderating these pressures. Analysis indicated growth
of money at about a5per cent annual rate from June
to September, assuming prevailing money market con-
ditions were maintained. The Committee directed
that to the extent possible this growth rate should be
achieved while at the same time moderating market
pressures. Thus, the target growth rate of money was
increased fromn the 3 and 4 per cent rates targeted
earlier in the year.
In addition to the actions taken by the Committee,
two other actions were taken by the Federal Reserve.
On the same day as the June Committee meeting, the
Board of Governors suspended Regulation Q ceilings
on 30- to 89-day maturity CD’s and other single-ma-
turity time deposits of $100,000 or more. Also, in late
June the administration of the discount window was
temporarily relaxed, in order to accommodate banks
which were lending to firms having difficulty in ob-
taining financing in the commercial paper market.
July 21 Meeting — Preliminary Commerce Depart-
ment figures indicated that real GNP had increased
only slightly in the second quarter, but projections
continued to suggest that real CNP would pick up in
the second half of 1970. Data for June showed that
industrial production had declined further, but retail
sales and housing starts had risen. The unemploy-
ment rate had declined to 4.7 per cent in June, from
5 per cent in May.
In view of the declining market interest rates, the
Committee decided to place less emphasis on mod-
erating market pressures and more emphasis on
achieving the targets for monetary aggregates. The
Committee agreed that a 5 per cent rate of growth in
money remained the appropriate target for the third
quarter (from June to September), but stated that if
deviations from this target rate developed, they should
be on the upside. The wording of the operating clause
of the July directive was similar to the May 5 direc-
tive, calling for open market operations to be carried
out to achieve growth targets for aggregates, but
added a proviso clause that open market operations
should be modified if financial pressures developed.
Money Market Conditions and
Monetary Aggregates
From April through July, the money stock (old
series) increased at a 2 per cent annual rate, while
the adjusted bank credit proxy increased at an 8 per
cent rate. The latter series was heavily influenced by
the reintermediation of time deposits into banks. The
monetary base grew at a 5.6 per cent rate in this
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period. The substantially slower growth of money
than the base is attributable largely to the rapid
growth of time deposits. This rapid reintermediation
of time deposit funds inito banks absorbed reserves
which otherwise could have supported an expansion
in demand deposits. In genera], short—term rates rose
in April and May and tended to fall in June and July.
Open market operations xvere aimed primarily at
moderating pressures in financial markets following
the May 26 and June 23 meetings. Although at the
time of the May 26 meeting a 7 per cent rate of
gro\vth in money was expected in the second quarter,
the old series grew at a 4.2 per cent rate, close to the
4 per cent target desired (the revised data released
in late November indicated the growth of money in
this period was at about a6per cent annual rate).
August through November:
Easing in Money and Credit Markets
In the four meetings from August 18 through No-
vember 17, the emphasis on moderating money mar-
ket pressures was reduced, and longer-run objectives
in terms of growth in aggregates were re-established.
In general, the directives in this period called for a
dual policy objective of both “some easing of condi-
tions in credit markets” and “moderate growth in
money amid attendmuit bank credit expansion.”
Easing in credit markets was sought during this pe-
riod because members of the Committee were con-
cerned about the lack of decline in long-term interest
rates. These members felt that it was desirable to
have long-term rates decline in order to encourage
recovery of residential construction and state and lo-
cal government spending. In general, the instructions
in the directives were as follows:
--the Committee seeks to promote some easing of
conditions in credit markets and moderate growth in
money and attendant bank credit expansion over the
months ahead. System open market operations until
the next meeting of the Committee shall be con-
ducted with a view to maintaining hank reserves and
market conditions consistent with those objectives.
At times, these dual policy objectives could be in
conflict with one another, but, in practice, they xvere
not generally in conflict over this period. The de-
mands for credit in the private economy continued
to ease as the pace of economic activity continued
to slow, at least partly in response to restrictive
actions of late 1969.
Economic Outlook and Policy Decisions
August 18 Meeting — Projections for real GNP re-
mained much the same in August as in July; that is,
for some increase in real GNP in the second half of
1970, although below potential. It was noted that
prices were still rising rapidly, but not as fast as
earlier.
The money stock was expected to gro\v at an an-
nual rate of about 4 per cent over the third quarter,
if prevailing money market conditions were main-
tained, and more easing in money markets was be-
lieved needed to achieve a 5 per cent rate of growth
in money. In the discussion by members of the
Committee, an abatement of expectations of continu-
ing inflation was noted, and it was agreed that policy
should be directed at stimulating real growth of the
economy, while at the same time being careful not to
revive inflationary expectations. To stimulate real
growth, the Committee directed open market opera-
tions to promote some easing in credit markets and to
seek growth in the money stock at about a 5 per cent
annual rate. As in the July directive, the Committee
stated that it preferred deviations from this target to
be on the upside.
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Three members, Mr. Hayes, Mr. Brimmer, and
Mr. Francis, dissented from this directive. They dis-
sented primarily because “they were opposed to the
promotion of ‘some easing of conditions in credit
markets’ as a specific objective of Committee policy
at this time.” They considered t]us easing unnecessary
to expand economnic activity and involving “risk of
rekindling inflationary expectations.
September 15 Meeting — At this meeting the Com-
mnittee was infonned that the money stock series con-
tained a definite bias. Board of Governors stafi
analysis indicated that further easing of money mar-
ket conditions would be necessary in order for the
money stock (roughly adjusted for bias) to grow
at an annual rate of 5 per cent in the foumth quarter.
The Committee decided that a 5 per cent growth in
money and some easing in credit markets remained
appropriate objectives for monetary policy in the
fourth quarter.
Some mnembers felt money should grow somewhat
faster than 5 per cent, while others felt that the money
series should be dc-emphasized at this time, in part
due to the uncertainties relating to the forthcoming
revision of the money stock series. Some members
preferred that bank credit be given more weight, be-
lieving that reintermediation was about over. How-
ever, it was decided that for the present, “prepon-
derant weight should be given to the money stock
“in assaying the implications of the behavior of finan-
cial aggregates for System operating decisions.”
Mr. Hayes dissented from the directive, and ex-
pressed concern about again aiming toward “an easing
of conditions in credit markets.” He noted that inter-
est rates had already fallen and “was not convinced
that further easing would he required to achieve the
objective ... of moderate growth in nlonev and hank
credit.” He also expressed concern over “the possible
inflationary effects of a policy calling for progressive
easing of credit conditions.”
October 20 Meeting — A rise in real GNP at a 1.4
per cent annual rate for the third quarter was indi-
cated by preliminary Commerce Department figures.
Also in September, there had been a fall in industrial
production \vhich was attributed primarily to the au-
tomobile strike. Unemployment had advanced in
September to 5.5 per cent from 5.1 per cent in Au-
gust. Real GNP was projected to move up slightly in
the fourth quarter, but the auto strike clouded most
statistics at the time.
Analysis presented indicated that if money market
conditions similar to those recently prevailing were
mnaintained, the money series (roughly adjusted)
would grow at about a5per cent annual rate over
the fourth quarter (from September to December).
The Committee agreed that this remained an appro-
priate target, accompanied by some easing in credit
market conditions. As at the previous meeting, some
members expressed a desire for a faster growth rate
of money, while others wanted less emnphasis given to
achieving money gro\vth targets.
Mr. Hayes again dissented for essentially the same
reasons as the previous meeting. He did not disagree
with a 5 per cent growth rate in money, but “he was
concerned about the directive language reading ‘the
Committee seeks to promote some easing of condi-
tions in credit markets,’ because it implied to him
that a persistent push toward lo\ver interest rates was
intended, irrespective of market forces. Such a course,
in his view, would involve undue risks of rekindling
inflationary expectations and of weakening the inter-
national position of the dollar.”
Substantial declines in short-term market interest
rates had occurred so far in 1970. reflecting the weak-
ness in demand for credit relative to supply. In re-
sponse to similar supply and demand forces, the
prime rate, the interest rate charged by banks on
loans to their best business customners, had been re-
duced from 8 per cent to 7¼ per cent on September
21. On Novemnher 11 audI sneceeding days, tile Fed-
eral Reserve Banks reduced their discount rate from
6 per cent to 5¾per cent. On November 12, the
prime bank loan rate was reduced to 7¼ per cent, and
only two ~veekslater \vas reduced to 7 per cent.
November 17 Meeting — Board of Governors staff
projections reviewed by the Committee indicated that
real GNP would not grow in the fourth quarter, and
data for October showed a decline in retail sales and
industrial production, while the unemployment rose
further. The weaknesses in economic activity were at
least partially caused by the automobile industry
strike. Projections suggested a rebound in economic
activity in the first quarter of 1971, assuming an end
to the strike in time near future.
The money stock rose only slightly (revised series)
in October, and analysis given at the Novemnber meet-
ing indicated that further easing of money markets
conditions \vould be necessary if even a 4 per cent
rate of growth in money was sought in the fourth
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quarter.15 This shortfall below the 5 per cent target
growth of money desired by the Committee was at-
tributed to weakness in the demand for money and
credit, mostly associated with the auto stmike. Again,
the view prevailed that the demand for money, or the
“transactions needs’ of the nonbank public, determines
the growth of the money stock. This view appears to
attribute relatively little significance to growth of
bank reserves or the mommetary base in the detennina-
tion of the growth of money, even over a period of
three or four months.
The Committee agreed that some further easing
of credit and mnoderate growth in money remained
appropriate targets, but felt that the actions that
might be necessary in order to achieve a5per cent
growth in money in both the fourth quarter of 1970
and the first quarter of 1971 could result in unde-
sirable fluctuations in mnoney and credit mnarket condi-
tions. The consensus of the Committee members was
that a “4 per cent growth rate in the fourth quarter
would he acceptable if the results of operating experi-
ence over coming sveeks bore out the indication of
the stafl analysis that attainment of a 5 per cent rate
would require a sharp easing of money market condi-
tions.” This decision was made with the expectation
that money would grow faster in the first quarter of
1971.
Mr. Maisel dissented from this directive because he
favored growth of money in the fourth quarter “at
least as high as the rate that had prevailed on the
average in the first three quarters of the year.” Thus,
he favored growth in money at about a 6 per cent
annual rate, whereas the Comnmittee was willing to ac-
cept a 4 per cent rate of gro\vth in the fourth quarter.
Money Market Conditions and
Monetary Aggregates
The money stock (revised series) grew at a 4.6 per
cent annual rate from July to Novemnher, and the
monetary base increased at a 4.2 per cent annnal
rate, Both short-term and long-termn interest rates de-
clined considerably during these months. For exam-
ple, three-month Treasury bills fell from about 6.45
per cent in July to about 5.3 per cent in November,
and ields on corporate Aaa bonds declined from 8.44
per cent to 8.05 per cent.
Following the August and September mneetings, open
market operations were aimed at easing credit mar-
kets and achieving moderate growth in money. Shoit-
term interest rates fell somewhat during this period,
mlnevision of the money series had been completed and was
available to members at the Novenmbem meeting.
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but yields on corporate and municipal bonds declined
only slightly. At tIme mid-September meeting, a 4.5
per cent growth rate of money (old series) was ex-
pected for the third quarter (June to Septemnber),1°
but a 5.2 per cent rate was obtained, close to the 5 per
cent target desired. The revised money series grew at
a 6.2 per cent rate in the third quarter.
Growth of the money stock fell short of expecta-
tions in October and November, Projections had indi-
cated an increase at a 4.5 per cent rate in October
(roughly adjusted series), while the actual rate was
about 1 per cent (revised series). The shortfall was
attributed to the weakness in credit demand associ-
ated with the automobile strike and slow business
activity.
The Federal funds rate dropped sharply in this
period; however, by observing the mnonetaiy base it
is evident that the slow growth in money is attribu-
table to the small increase in the monetary base in
October and November. The base grew at only a 2 per
cent annual rate in these two months.
Following the November meeting, easier money
mnarket conditions were sought in order to promote
easing in credit markets and growth of money. Part
of open market purchases were mnade in intermediate-
and long-term securities, which tend to lower longer-
terni interest rates. Both short-term and long-term




About 1 percentage point less was expected for the roughly
adjusted series, that is, 3.5 per cent.
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December: Less Emphasis on Aggregates
Less emphasis on aggregates prevailed during the
December 15 meeting. The summary of discussion
said, “the outlook for the monetary aggregates was
particularly uncertain at this time, both because of
the di~cultiesof assessing the precise impact on fi-
nancial markets of the surge in activity expected in
the aftermath of the automohile strike and because of
the churning in those mnarkets that is typical of the
period around the year-end.” In view of these uncer-
tainties, a number of Committee members suggested
that less weight be given to aggregates and more to
money market conditions.
The status of monetary aggregates as indicators of
mnonetary policy actions was somewhat unclear at this
juncture. Some members favored less emphasis only
on a temporary basis, while others were for less em-
phasis on “mnore general grounds.” Some members
brought attention to more broadly defined monetary
aggregates. For instance, money plus net time de-
posits grew at a rapid 10 per cent rate from February
to December. partly reflecting the rapid reintermedia-
tion of time deposits into banks.tm7
There was some disagreemnent as to the appropriate
targets for money in the fourth quarter of 1970 and
CNet time deposits are defined as total time deposits at coin-
mnercial banks less large negotiable certificates of deposit.
the first quarter of 1971. Money was expected to grow
faster than 5 per cent in the first quarter of 1971, and
members concluded that movements in this series in
the innnediate future should appear consistent with
the faster anticipated average rate. The Committee
agreed timat “money market conditions should be eased
if it appeared that shortfalls from those growth paths
svere developing, but that otherwise operations slmould
be directed at maiutaining the conditions most re-
cently attained.” The operating clause of the Decem-
ber directive read:
System open market operations shall be conducted
with a view to mnaimmtaining the recently- attained
mnoney mnarket conditions until the next meeting of
the Committee, provided that tIme expected rates of
growth in money and hammk credit will at least be
achieved.
Mr. Francis dissented from this directive, because
he favored both maintaining a target 5 per cent an-
nual rate of monetary growth and increasing the em-
plmasis on money rather than reducing it. He expressed
concern that a rate of growth in money at a rate faster
than 5 per cent could possibly prolong inflation and
even intensify it, while holding the growth in money
to a 5 per cent rate “was likely to assure steady prog-
ress toward moderating price increases, along with a
gradually increasing pace of expansion in real output.”
At the December meeting, it was still expected that
a 5 per cent growth of mnoney would occur in the
fourth quarter, even though the growth of money in
October and November had been substantially below
this target. I-Iowever, gro\vth of mnoney was substan-
tially less than expected in late Decemnber; for the
fourth quarter, money gresv at a 3.4 per cent rate.
Imnmediately after the December meeting, open mar-
ket operations were aimed at maintaining the pre-
vailing money conditions. Since the demands for
credit were continuing to ease substantially, mnarket
conditions remained easy. Nevertheless, Desk opera-
tions did not result in enough additional reserves to
achieve the desired gi-owth in money.
CONCLUSION
The year 1970 marked a “modest” beginning for the
use of monetary aggregates in the formulation and
imnplementation of mnonetamy policy decisions. The
emnphasis on aggregates, however, varied dunng the
year.
After the initial statemnent by tIme Comnmittee at the
January meeting, its position on monetary aggregates
evolved; at the Marcim and April meetings the objec-
tive of the directive was stated totally in terms of
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monetary aggregates. Beginning in May and continuing
through the July’ meeting, the emnphasis on aggregates
\vas greatly reduced, and replaced by other short-termn
objectives such as mnoderating pressures in financial
markets. Flowever, targets for aggregates still were to
be sought to the extent that they were consistent with
these other objectives. The Connnittee raised the
targets for money in several stages from a 3 per cent
rate for the second quarter (March mneeting) to a 5
per cent target for the third quarter at the July
meeting.t8 The emphasis on aggregates was some-
what reinstated at the August meeting and continued
through the November mneeting. Ho\vever, the objec-
tive of achieving “sonic easing of conditions in credit
markets” also was stated explicitly.
The December meeting left the future status of
mnonetary aggregates somewhat in doubt. The direc-
tive was again stated in terms of mnoney mnarket con-
ditions; some Commnittee members expressed reserva-
tions about the use of monetary aggregates, and some
desired mnore use of money market conditions. Part of
the return to primary emnphasis on mnoney market con-
ditions at the end of the year mnay have been due to
the data problems involving the revision of money
stock series. As \vas noted earlier, according to the old
series money growth had been fairly close to that
~8TheCommittee desired to have deviations from the 5 per
cent target on the upside.
sought by the Committee, but with the revision,
money had grown faster in the first three quarters of
the year than desired.
Although growth of the mnormey stock (old series)
was quite close to the quarterly targets desired by
the Committee, by looking mnore closely one could
argue that this \vas partly an accident. For example,
at the May 26 meeting a 7 per cent growth rate of
mnoney was expected for the second quarter. An un-
expected shortfall in mnoney occurred in June, and a
4.2 per cent rate was achieved in the second quarter,
quite close to the earlier 4 per cent target. Growth of
aggregates for the fourth quarter of 1970 was consid-
erably under-achieved. Growth of money in October
and Novemnher fell short of expectations, even though
money market conditions eased as was called for in
the directive. Despite these shortfalls, at the De-
cember 15 meeting, a 5 per cent rate of mnoney growth
was expected for the perIod September to December,
but only a 3.4 per cent rate (revised series) was
achieved.
These developments give the impression that con-
trol methods for money have yet to be perfected.
Part of the problem may’ lie with the “money market
conditions” approach. A mnore direct approach such as
controlling hank reserves or the monetary base may
be a more reliable nmethod for controlling time money
stock.
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